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Abstract: Supermarkets are rapidly penetrating urban food retail in Kenya and spreading well 
beyond their initial tiny market niche into the food markets of lower-income groups. Having 
penetrated processed and staple food markets much earlier and faster than fresh foods, they have 
recently begun to make inroads into the fresh fruits and vegetables category. The important 
changes in their procurement systems bring significant opportunities and challenges for small 
farmers, and have implications for agricultural diversification and rural development 
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Recent research has drawn attention to the rapid growth of supermarkets and the resulting 
structural transformation in the agrifood systems of developing countries (for example, Reardon 
and Berdegué (2002) for Latin America, and Weatherspoon and Reardon (2003) for Africa, 
focusing mainly on South Africa). In this essay we demonstrate that the supermarket sector is 
also developing rapidly in Kenya, a poor country (with a per capita GDP of roughly a dollar a 
day) where supermarket growth is endogenous and indigenous – without the heavy influence of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) by global retail chains that plays such an important role in 
supermarket trends in Asia and Latin America. Supermarkets in Kenya have grown from a tiny 
niche market only seven years ago to 20% of urban food retail today, and are rising fast. At issue 
is how this phenomenon is affecting food markets facing farmers, via changes in supermarket 
procurement systems. 
We focus on the fresh fruits and vegetables (FFV) category, because government and 
donors have high hopes of this being a motor of agricultural diversification for small farmers, 
given FFV’s assumed lack of scale economies, and because the relationship between 
supermarkets and FFV producers tends to have fewer intermediate steps, in particular in 
processing; procurement system changes are therefore expected to change more directly the 
market facing small farmers. Moreover, FFV in Kenya is a large sector, producing 3.2 million 
tons of fruits and vegetables with a rural-market value in 2002 of US$354m. (3% of GDP), and 
the majority of horticultural producers are smallholder farmers (providing 70% of the marketable 
FFV) who derive a large share of their cash income from horticulture (MoARD, 2002; Kamau, 
2000). Prior work on the supermarket channel for FFV sales has focused on exports (Jaffee, 
1994) including specifically to UK supermarkets (Dolan and Humphrey 2000), but the literature 
is bereft of studies on FFV sales to supermarkets in Kenya. Yet the great majority of Kenyan 
FFV goes to the domestic market (90% of the volume and 70% of the sales), and, as we show 
below, supermarkets in Kenya already buy half as much FFV as are exported (in volume terms). 
Finally, domestic FFV marketing studies, such as Dijkstra (1997, 1999a, b, 2001), do not cover 
local supermarkets. 
The essay proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the collection of primary field-survey 
data on which the study is based. Section 3 presents data on trends in the development of the 
supermarket sector in Kenya. Section 4 analyses the Kenyan supermarket chains’ procurement 
system changes for FFV and discusses the implications for farmers of these changes. Section 5 
concludes with policy and program implications.  
 
2. Data and Methods 
 
Given the absence of supermarket (or retailer) associations and industry publications, secondary 
data on supermarkets in Kenya are scarce (basically limited to supermarket annual reports and 
articles in the popular press).   
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Hence this essay is based on primary, field-survey data collected by the author during March to 
November 2003 and April 2004. (i) In-depth interviews were conducted with the executive 
managers and/or FFV managers of the top five supermarket chains, plus visits to their key FFV 
wholesale suppliers. (ii) A short survey was administered in 79 of the 87 urban areas with over 
25,000 population (according to the 1999 population census, CBS, 2002b), where all 
supermarket stores found in these urban areas were visited and either a manager interviewed 
and/or observational data collected; in total, 210 valid interviews in this category were 
conducted. (iii) A similar survey instrument was used to interview 250 non-supermarket retailers 
(smaller self-service groceries and traditional retailers such as greengrocers, open air market 
stalls, kiosks, street hawkers and over-the-counter shops). (iv) A survey of 450 households in 
Nairobi, focused on their shopping habits. (v) A varied set of additional data was gathered, 
including interviews with government officials, key industry experts in the retail and agri-food 
industry sectors, and other private sector firms, and NGOs involved in the FFV industry. 
 
3. Patterns and Determinants of the Rise of Supermarkets in Kenya 
 
3.1 General Trends 
 
We use the definition used by ACNielsen-Kenya for supermarkets, as ‘self-service stores 
handling predominantly food and drug fast moving consumer goods (FMCG) with at least 150m
2 
(1,625 sq.ft) of floor space’. We defined ‘hypermarkets’ as having at least 15 times that floor 
space (2,250m
2). Using these definitions, as of 2003, there were 225 large-format stores in 
Kenya – 209 supermarkets and 16 hypermarkets.
1 In the text, for simplicity, we use the term 
‘supermarkets’ to refer to both formats, distinguishing only where needed. Note that, while the 
cut-off point for the definition of a supermarket is relatively low by international standards 
(where the threshold is usually 300-400 m
2), it is judged in relation to the traditional store size by 
the ACNielsen definition. However, it should be noted that the average size of a supermarket in 
Kenya is 9,900 sq. ft. Moreover, most (80%) of the stores are part of a chain of supermarkets. 
Thus, small independent supermarkets are a small share of the sector. 
Supermarkets have taken market share away from traditional food retailers such as 
kiosks, greengrocers, over-the-counter shops, market stalls and street hawkers (Table 1). The 
supermarket sector had an estimated turnover of US$520m. in 2002. Supermarket food sales 
represent roughly 70% of total sales – US$365m. Using triangulation from macro-data, our 
consumer and retail surveys and secondary data, we estimate the total size of the urban food 
retail market at US$1.9 billion. The market share of supermarkets in total urban food retailing is 
therefore roughly 20%. (This is similar to Indonesia now or Mexico five years ago.) Sub-
supermarket-size self-service shops represent another 17% of the market, and the rest, 63%, is 







                                                 
1 We do not include in our analysis the estimated 900 to 1,400 mini-supermarkets and convenience stores, also non-
traditional retail formats, that have emerged in recent years in urban Kenya.   
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Table 1: Food and FFV Retailing in Urban Kenya by Type of Outlet, 2003 
Food Sales FFV  Sales 














Kiosks, OTC shops, greengrocers  27,000  600  32  131  36 
Market stalls and street hawkers  Na  590  31  211  58 
Supermarkets and hypermarkets 225  365  20  15  4 
Smaller self-service shops  1,200  310  17  7  2 
All types  Na  1,865  100  364  100 
Note: the exchange rate used was 1US$=Ksh76.9. 
Sources: authors’ estimations based on authors’ retailer and consumer surveys and secondary 
data (AC Nielsen, 2002; CBS, 2002a, b, c; World Bank, 2004; World Gazetteer, 2004; UN 
Population Division, 2003; UN Habitat, 2002; UN Statistics Division, 2003). 
 
Over the next 5 to 10 years, the supermarket sector is expected to grow at a rate similar to the 
current growth rate, i.e. about 18% per year since 1995
2. At this growth rate, and assuming a 
market growth (urban population growth) of 4.7% (UN Population Division, 2003), 
supermarkets will double their market share by 2009 and become the dominant urban food 
retailers by 2011. This may happen even earlier if global, Asian or South African chains include 
FDI in Kenya in their strategies in the near future, which is perhaps a reasonable assumption. 
The supermarkets’ share in FFV retail has lagged behind their overall penetration of food 
retail (as is common in other parts of the world, for example in Latin America, see Reardon and 
Berdegué, 2002), but the trends are parallel. We estimate that out of US$364m. worth of FFV 
marketed to the urban consumer in Kenya in 2002, supermarkets represent US$14m. or 4% (i.e., 
an estimated 35,000 MT). As expected, the share is higher in large cities; in Nairobi the market 
share is 6-7%.  
However, it is interesting to compare supermarket sales of FFV (circa 35,000 tons) with 
exports of FFV – 67,000 tons (MoARD, 2002). While research and policy attention has focused 
either on the export market or the traditional market, this third market – the supermarket market 
– represents already 50% of exports in terms of volumes. Because of the higher quality, higher 
value-added and different product composition (e.g., shelf-ready pre-packs of Asian vegetables 
for UK supermarkets), the same cannot yet be set about the value. While supermarkets sold an 
estimated $14m. worth of fresh fruits and vegetables in 2002, the exported FOB value was 
$160m. In terms of farm value, the gap closes with supermarkets representing $9m. and exports 
$45m. as exporters have higher marketing margins than supermarkets (roughly 70% vs. 40%). 
 
3.2 Determinants of Growth 
 
While the supermarket is not new to Kenya (the first supermarkets arose in the 1960s), their 
rapid growth is a very recent phenomenon, having taken off since the mid-1990s. This growth of 
the supermarket sector in Kenya has mainly been driven by three factors that coincide with some 
of those important in supermarket diffusion in other developing countries.  
                                                 
2 We expect this because the drivers of growth (urbanization, competition, trade and market liberalization; see 
section 3.2) are expected to continue.   
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First, there has been rapid urbanization: the urban population made up 13% of the total in 1975, 
and 36% in 2000, and is expected to surpass the rural population by 2013 (UN Population 
Division 2003). Based on these UN statistics, the average urban population growth rate (4.7%) is 
triple that of the overall population (1.6%), as the rural population has started to decline even in 
absolute numbers. The populations of intermediate cities like Nakuru and Eldoret doubled 
between 1989 and 2002 (World Gazetteer, 2004). Moreover, new registrations for buses and 
mini-buses, mostly consisting of public service vehicles providing intra and inter-city 
transportation, quintupled between 1993 and 2002 (CBS, 2002b, 2003). 
Second, trade and domestic market liberalization started in 1993. Figure 1 depicts the 
growth of Kenya’s current top five supermarket chains over the period 1975 (when Uchumi, 
Kenya’s largest supermarket chain, was established) to 2003. It is a kinked curve with growth 
really taking off in 1995, i.e., after the 1993 policy changes were starting to have an effect. The 
1993 economic reforms, including liberalization and stabilization policies, had several important 
effects for supermarkets. (i) Import licensing removal (more imports) and market liberalization 
(more domestic competitors) led to a dramatic increase in product variety and shifted the retail 
market from a sellers’ to a buyers’ market in which retailers had to fight for the consumers’ 
shilling vote. The direct consequence of the increased product variety in the marketplace is that it 
favored the bigger stores (supermarkets) able to stock a wider assortment of products (economies 
of scope). (ii) Price liberalization also played into the hands of the supermarkets because it 
facilitated, in Kenya, the low margin-high turnover strategy that has been the core of most of the 
supermarket growth around the world. (iii) There was a mild and short-lived recovery of the 
economy in 1995/6 (with annual real GDP growth in the 4% range) which gave consumers the 
buying power to try all these new products that supermarkets were marketing to them. However, 
note that Kenya’s economy deteriorated afterwards, ending the 1990s with no growth. With a 
downward trend in real GDP per capita over the last half-decade (CBS, 2002a), there is no 
indication of a general rise in consumer incomes in Kenya. Yet, as Figure 2 shows, the 
supermarkets’ fast growth has persisted even in these slack economic times. This is probably due 
to their being able to offer low-priced processed foods and staples, appealing to lower middle-
income consumer groups.  
 











































Figure 2: Growth of Supermarkets in Broader Macro Context 














  Sources: sales floor space is based on authors’ supermarket survey; 
    population data from Heston 2002; GDP data are from Econstats, 2004.  
 
Third, while Kenya’s supermarket revolution is unlike that of most developing countries outside 
of Africa that had massive inflows of retail FDI after investment liberalization in the mid/late 
1990s (but similar in the following respect to South Africa, see Weatherspoon and Reardon, 
2003), Kenya’s supermarket sector growth has been almost completely indigenous and 
endogenous. However, inter-chain competition in domestic investment has been very vigorous, 
playing the role of foreign versus domestic chains’ investment competition seen elsewhere. Of 
course, ‘if’ and when outside chains do enter, the intensity of the investment rivalry will 
increase. The entry of foreign retailers after domestic supermarkets reach a critical point in their 
growth is what has been observed in other developing countries (e.g., in Argentina; Ghezan et al. 
2002)
 3. These foreign chains bring with them high levels of operational efficiency and spark a 
price war which forces all supermarkets to speed up the already initiated process of driving down 
costs and pushing into new, less competitive but also less rich markets (smaller towns, lower 
income neighborhoods). 
Before 1993, the main supermarkets grew within the boundaries of a single town, leading 
to local fiefdoms. Uchumi broke this pattern in 1993 by building its first store outside Nairobi, in 
Nakuru, starting a national-level competition that has built-in crescendo. Most notably, the 
rivalry between leading chains Uchumi and Nakumatt became an important growth driver; a new 
strategy by one chain forces imitation and/or a counter strategy by its competitor. For example, 
Nakumatt’s introduction of large-format stores in 1995 led to the introduction of hypermarkets 
by Uchumi in 1997. Uchumi’s subsequent introduction of a fully-fledged FFV department in that 
year (coinciding with its first hypermarket in Nairobi) was followed by Nakumatt in 2001. Over 
time, this competition has moved from such conspicuous differentiation strategies to the more 
subtle price-based competition implying economies of both scale and scope.  
 
                                                 
3 The interest of South African supermarket chains to enter the Kenya markets dates back to at least 1994 when 
Pick‘n Pay offered to buy Uchumi (authors’ interview with Suresh Shah, MD Uchumi 1986-99, 27 March 2003). 
50
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3.3 A Three-Tiered Supermarket Sector with High Concentration: Emergence of Uchumi 
and Nakumatt as Market Leaders 
 
Kenya’s supermarket sector has three tiers (Table 2). The first tier consists of the two clear 
market leaders and also the leading FFV retailers, Uchumi Supermarkets and Nakumatt, which 
together control nearly 50% of the supermarket sector. The second tier consists of Tusker, 
Ukwala, and Metro Cash ‘n Carry chains. These top five chains have 28% of the large-format 
stores in Kenya and 60% of the sales, indicating a concentrated sector (similar to Latin American 
and European levels of concentration). Figure 3 shows that since 1996, in terms of store size (a 
proxy for sales), the top five have surpassed the other supermarkets and are growing at a faster 
pace, increasing their dominance over time. The supermarkets in the third tier consist of small 
chains (of which there are about 40) and independent (single-store) supermarkets. There is only 
one publicly traded Kenyan supermarket (Uchumi) and one foreign-owned supermarket of 
significance (Metro). 
While selling FFV in supermarkets is not a rarity, given that overall 4 out of 10 
supermarkets sell them to various degrees, it is highly concentrated in the hands of two leading 
chains. Of the Ksh1 billion worth of FFV sold through supermarkets, Uchumi and Nakumatt 
represent roughly 70% and 20% respectively.  
 




















Uchumi 23  4  27  16,400  26  100  Public  Kenyan 
Nakumatt 4  8  12  48,700  20  100  Asian  Kenyan 
Second tier 
Tusker 7  1  8  14,500  6  25  African  Kenyan 
Ukwala 9  0  9  9,100  4  0  Asian  Kenyan 
Metro 2  1  3  28,400  4  0  South  African 
Third tier 
Small chains  71  1  72  6,200  24  40 
54% Afric. Kenyan 
44% Asian Kenyan 
2% Other 
Independents 93  1  94 4,200  16  22 
51% Afric. Kenyan 
45% Asian Kenyan 
4% Other 
All supermarkets 
All 209  16  225  9,900  100  41 
13% Public Kenyan 
41% Afric. Kenyan 
42% Asian Kenyan 
4% Other 
Note: market shares refer to total sales and are based on sales estimated from store sizes, interviews with 
upper-level supermarket managers, the supermarket survey and Uchumi’s annual reports. 
Source: authors’ national supermarket survey.  
  
  7

















Top 5 Supermarkets Chains Other Supermarkets
 





Uchumi Supermarkets Ltd was established as a wholly government-owned company from three 
existing stores in Nairobi in 1975. In 1992, as part of the government’s ongoing structural 
adjustment programmes, Uchumi became a public company traded on the Nairobi Stock 
Exchange. However, its three main shareholders, who jointly owned 51% of the stock in 2003, 
are the original ones, namely, ICDC, wholly government-owned, and KWA and ICDCI, both of 
which have the government as a key shareholder (Uchumi, 2003). This means that the 
government has a strong presence on the board of Uchumi which has to approve major strategic 
decisions such as investments.  
A new phase in the company’s history began in 2001 when Uchumi embarked on an 
ambitious five-year expansion plan, key features of which include an increase in the number of 
stores from 17 to 50, an expansion into the regional market (Uganda, Tanzania), the construction 
of a new distribution centre in Nairobi and the installation of a satellite-based IT system linking 
all its stores to this new centre. Good progress was made at first: 10 new stores (including two 
hypermarkets in Nairobi and one in Kampala, Uganda) had opened by December 2002 (doubling 
its total floor space from 215,000 to 450,000 sq. ft over this two-year period), the new 
distribution centre was finished by 2003 and the new IT system started in September 2003. 
However, a combination of high-interest short-term financing tools and investments outpacing 
sales growth led to the first annual loss in the company’s history (for the fiscal year ending 30 
June 2003). The subsequent backlash from worried investors led to the decision to put the 5-year 
expansion plan on hold for a year.  
Uchumi took $135m. in sales in 2003 (Uchumi, 2003), about 1% of Kenyan GDP, more 
or less the same as Wal-Mart/US sales are of US GDP. Uchumi today is the market leader with 
27 branches in seven urban areas throughout the country (Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru, Eldoret, 
Meru, Karatina, Kisii) and one branch (a hypermarket and the company’s flagship store) in 
Kampala, Uganda. These 28 branches include various store formats, reflecting the fact that 
Uchumi targets customers from all socio-economic classes. Its 4 hypermarkets with large 
parking areas along the main entry/exit roads in Nairobi mainly attract high- and middle-income 
consumers. Its smaller ‘neighborhood’ stores in the city’s residential areas (‘estates’) mostly  
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target middle-income consumers. Its city centre stores near busy bus stages (5,000-20,000 sq. ft) 
mostly attract the middle- to low-income consumers. 
In 1997, Uchumi was the first major chain in Kenya to introduce FFV items in its stores 
(as part of an overall strategy of building up ‘fresh’ categories: dairy, meats, bread, FFV). 
Starting out with some trial sales, FFV sales are now over Ksh50m. per month. Today, all 
Uchumi branches have a FFV section, although their size and assortment vary with the customer-
base, with the most developed sections found in the hypermarkets where they can take up 7% of 
the sales floor space and offer over 300 stock keeping units (SKUs) from American pink sweet 
potatoes to zebra yellow melons (although only 100 or so are available at any one time). The 
FFV section in hypermarkets also includes value-added (and increasingly branded) products such 
as a line of organic products or pre-cut vegetable packs. In stores targeting lower-income 
consumers, the FFV sections are smaller, carry fewer SKUs and focus on the staple FFV items of 
the poor (such as kale, spinach, cabbage). Notwithstanding this broad customer targeting, FFV 
sales at Uchumi are still very much focused on Nairobi (90% of sales) and its hypermarkets 





Privately-owned Nakumatt was established in Nakuru in 1985 (then still Nakuru Mattresses) and 
remained a small operation until it moved to Nairobi in 1992. By assertively opening stores in 
key locations and by expanding existing ones, Nakumatt grew into a major supermarket chain 
with 12 large-size branches in Kenya’s three main urban centres (9 in Nairobi, 2 in Mombasa, 1 
in Kisumu). Nakumatt’s growth is facilitated by being part of a network of companies with 
cross-shareholdings (Nakumatt Holdings), which gives it excellent access to financing 
(investment loans), human resources (rotating managers) and physical capital (such as trucks). 
In 1995, inspired by first-hand experience with large, customer-oriented US retail 
formats, Nakumatt introduced the supercentre store format into Kenya (i.e., department stores 
with a fully-fledged supermarket added à la Wal-Mart). Today 8 of its 12 branches can be 
categorized as supercentres. One of these, the Nakumatt Mega branch in Nairobi, has 175,000 
sq.ft of floor space, making it the largest retail outlet in East Africa. The large average size of its 
stores explains why, although it has less than half the number of outlets of its main competitor 
Uchumi, Nakumatt has 30% more floor space (585,000 sq. ft vs. 450,000 sq. ft). Throughout, 
Nakumatt’s consumer focus has been mainly on the high-income segment (50% of its customers 
fall into this category). In 2001 Nakumatt started selling FFV in its stores. Hesitant at first, it has 
now fully embraced the FFV section and is rapidly expanding it; all its branches have a modern 
FFV section. Chain-wide sales have grown to Ksh16m. per month and are expected to grow to 
Ksh50m. per month within the next three years. 
 
Second and Third Tiers 
 
The second tier in the hierarchy consists of the medium-sized Tusker Mattresses, Ukwala and 
Metro Cash ‘n Carry chains with an estimated 6%, 4% and 4% of the supermarket sector 
respectively. All three are catering to and fiercely competing for the dollar vote of the middle- to 
low-income urban consumers, Tusker and Ukwala by operating stores located downtown near 
the busy bus stations used by consumers in this income class, who do part of their shopping  
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before going home at the end of the day, and Metro indirectly by supplying the smaller self-
service stores located near these same bus stages as well as in the residential areas. The Tusker 
and Nakumatt chains are in a strategic partnership which, given the two chains complementary 
customer bases, targets urban households from the lowest to the highest income category.  
The third tier, the remaining 38% of the supermarket sector, consists of a varied group of 
smaller chains and independent stores. Here we find the supermarkets located in the smaller 
towns as well as those that have traditionally catered to high-income groups and expatriates (e.g., 
settlers’ stores). These stores compete with the above chains by (i) moving to and expanding in 
understored areas, (ii) adjusting their product assortment with specialty foods for a particular 
target group (e.g., expatriates) and/or (iii) developing a more personalized service. The small 
chains group consists overwhelmingly of 2-branch and 3-branch chains (68% and 27% 
respectively). About 40% of these supermarkets sell FFV.  
 
3.4 Diffusion Patterns 
 
Our research revealed several interesting patterns in the socio-economic and geographic 
diffusion of supermarkets in Kenya. First, while Kenya’s white and Asian consumers were 
important as part of the initial narrow base of consumers for the early stages of supermarket 
development, we calculate that their purchases now constitute a mere 15% of total supermarket 
sales. 
Second, supermarkets have spread from higher-income niches in the capital, to middle- 
and lower-middle income segments in the capital and out into secondary cities and lately into 
towns. Table 3 shows that they are now found in urban centers of all sizes. In 2003, nearly 60% 
of the stores were located outside of Nairobi and basically every provincial capital had one or 
more supermarkets. Taking store size into account as a proxy for sales, Nairobi still accounts for 
the majority (56%) of sales. In terms of store density, it is clearly in the lead with 36 stores per 
million, nearly three times the level of the rest of urban Kenya. 
 
Table 3: Geographic Distribution of Supermarkets in Kenya, 2003 













sq. ft  % 
(stores  
per m.) 
Nairobi 1 2,600  94  42  1,190  56  36 
Mombasa 1  800 10  4  220  10  13 
100-350 18  3,320 66  29  480  22  20 
50-100 30  2,670  33  25  190  9  12 
25-50 37 1,730  17  8  50  2  10 
10-25 33  760  5  2  20  1  7 
All centers  120  11,880  225  100  2,150  100  19 
Sources: population data extrapolated from 1999 census data (CBS, 2002b) using urban population 
growth data from UN Population Division (2003) and UN Habitat (2004). Supermarket data based on 
the authors’ survey. 
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Figure 4 depicts the growth of supermarkets in terms of floor space in Nairobi vs. other towns 
over the period 1975-2003. In the absence of historical statistics on the number and size of retail 
outlets, we used the year of establishment of the supermarket stores in existence in 2003 as a 
proxy. The figure shows that supermarkets are growing almost simultaneously in Nairobi and 
elsewhere. 
 
Figure 4: Growth of Supermarkets in Nairobi vs. Other Urban Centers 










































Nairobi Other Urban Centres
 
Source: authors’ national supermarkets survey. 
 
Nevertheless, there appear to be two successive waves of diffusion. First, one observes the 
emergence of independent stores which expand to other nearby centers, becoming small local 
chains in the process. Then the top five chains move into town, creating a shake-out whereby the 
out-competed smaller chains either close down completely or move to the next, less competitive 
and (increasingly) smaller town, thus fuelling the first wave of diffusion. From their base in 
Nairobi, the top five chains have moved into Mombasa (population 800,000) and intermediate 
cities (population 200-350,000). Uchumi moved to Nakuru in 1993, to Eldoret in 1999 and to 
Mombasa in 2000. Nakumatt moved to Mombasa in 1996 and to Kisumu in 1997. Metro moved 
to Eldoret in 1999 and to Kisumu in 2001. Ukwala followed suit moving to Eldoret in 1999 and 
to Kisumu in 2003. The top five chains are now also expanding into smaller towns: Uchumi, as 
part of its five-year plan, opened three of its latest stores in smaller towns like Meru, Karatina 
(both around 125,000 inhabitants) and Kisii (75,000 inhabitants) and announced further plans for 
expansion into other small towns like Thika and Nyeri.  
In their expansion from Nairobi, the supermarket chains select towns that have (i) large 
populations (in the town centre and its hinterland), (ii) many households with a regular income 
(implying more potential regular customers), (iii) nearby high-consumption customers such as 
rich white farmers or major tourist resorts, and (iv) less competition from other supermarkets. 
Table 3 shows that moving away from Nairobi to intermediate and then smaller towns implies 
moving from high to lower supermarket density (and thus less competitive towns). Growing out 
into underserved urban areas is considered by the Kenyan supermarket sector a big opportunity – 
‘a domestic supermarket scene far from being saturated’ (Wachira, 2002; Wahome, 2001).  
The growth of Kenya’s supermarkets has also taken on an East African regional character 
with outward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) facilitated by regional trade agreements 
COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) and (from July 2004) EAC (East  
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African Community). Against the back-drop of a rapidly growing regional trade (for example, 
since 1998 COMESA has outgrown the European Union as Kenya’s most important export 
market), Uchumi opened its first branch outside Kenya in Kampala (Uganda) in December 2002, 
a key motivation being the expectation of higher margins there (Akumu, 2003). From their 
regional expansion plans for the next five years it appears this is just the first drop of an 
upcoming flood of outward FDI by Kenya supermarkets. When interviewed on the topic, Mr. 
Vijay Shah, Strategy Coordinator of Nakumatt, indicated that his company plans to open 
branches in Uganda (2), Tanzania (2), Rwanda (1), Burundi (1), Zambia (1) and Zimbabwe (1) 
over the next five years. Uchumi’s expansion plans include stores in Tanzania and Rwanda as 
well as more stores in Uganda. 
Such rapid diffusion of supermarkets – the start of a retail transformation in Kenya – is 
bound to have, as it has had elsewhere, important effects on the agrifood systems, and markets 
faced by farmers. To understand these changes we now focus on changes in the procurement 
systems of the leading chains. 
 
4. Supermarket FFV Procurement Systems and Requirements 
 
Our conceptual approach to the changing structure of the supermarkets’ FFV procurement 
system mainly draws from strategic management theory (SMT) and transaction cost theory 
(TCT). Each theory addresses a different side of the same coin: SMT deals with the objective of 
creating competitive advantage (benefit-side), TCT looks at optimizing the cost efficiency of the 
institutional format (governance structure) used in creating competiting advantage (cost-side). 
  SMT postulates that economic agents develop and implement strategies which reduce 
competition in the industry and thus enable them to earn above normal profits (Porter 1980, 
Barney 1996). They do so by (continiously) creating competitive advantages
4 which competitors 
cannot easily imitate or nullify because of barriers to entry (e.g., economies of scale, product 
differentiation, collusion in a concentrated industry, and so on). The extent to which firms can 
develop such competitive advantages critically hinges on how (well) they are linked to their 
input and output markets. In the TCT framework (Williamson 1985, 1991), economic agents (in 
our case the supermarket produce procurement managers) choose vertical coordination strategies 
that minimize the transaction costs which follow from having to deal with uncertainties caused 
by a combination of the agent’s bounded rationality, the (potential) opportunism of their trading 
partners (in our case the FFV suppliers) and the presence of (physical and organizational) assets 
which are highly specific to the transaction (i.e., these assets loose much of their value in their 
next best alternative use). Vertical coordination strategies can be set out along a continuum from 
spot market transactions (high in flexibility, low in control) to vertical integration (high in 
control, but danger of x-inefficiencies) (Peterson et al. 2001).  
Before the rise of domestic supermarkets, there existed two distinct FFV marketing 
systems, one at each of the extremes of the vertical coordination continuum: the traditional 
domestic system and the export system. Kenya’s traditional FFV marketing system is 
characterised by fragmentation at both the producer and the retailer ends of the supply chain, 
market power with the wholesalers, long channels, direct payment to suppliers, little quality 
control or grading, few standards, little or no product innovation, small volume transactions and 
                                                 
4 Examples of such competitive advantages are: lower production costs, higher perceived product quality, the 
development of products with unique benefits that are highly appreciated in the market.  
  12
small inventories. In stark contrast, the export-oriented part of the horticultural sub-sector is 
highly dynamic, continuously developing new products and implementing institutional and 
organisational changes (such as contracts, codes of good agricultural practices, traceability 
systems) that have increased competitiveness and spurred a rapid growth of exports to the 
European Union market. 
The introduction of a fresh FFV section by the leading supermarket chains in the second 
half of the 1990s created a third marketing system for FFV in Kenya, which over time is shifting 
from the traditional to the export model. At first, supermarkets relied on traditional wholesale 
markets, basically taking the traditional informal sector supply chains of FFV as givens and 
working with these. This is the way the non-leading chains still work today, and we do not 
therefore deal with them in this section. Overall, wholesale markets remain the main source for 
these supermarkets, with on average 29% of supermarket FFV supplies coming from this source. 
Next are direct supplies from farmers (23%), supplies from brokers (19%) and supplies from 
importers (11%). The remaining 18% consist of supplies from own farms and from exporters. 
The FFV section in Kenya’s supermarkets has played an important role in their 
competitive strategies. At first, simply having a FFV section was the competitive advantage, this 
then shifted to having a larger assortment, better quality, more reliable availability and more 
value-added products (as the initial focus was on high-income consumers), followed by the 
current focus on getting prices down (in order to reach middle-to-low income consumers) and 
plans are being drawn to make food safety guarantees the next competitive advantage in the FFV 
retailing by supermarkets. In aiming for these different objectives, supermarkets face many 
uncertainties when sourcing form spot markets: quality, availability, price, and so on, are all 
fluctuating strongly. In order to gain more control over their supply chains, supermarkets have 
started shifting away from spot markets along the vertical coordination continuum. While 
vertical integration (supermarkets owning their own farms) has emerged in Kenya’s supermarket 
sector, it is rare and appears to be destined to disappear as those cases indicate that the costs of 
organizing such disparate activities under one management are high. The governance structures 
supermarkets are moving toward most clearly are therefore contract relationships (intended to be 
long-term) which provide more control than spot markets but keep overhead costs down and 
provide greater operational flexibility. A similar observation on the importance of long-term 
contractual relationships was made by Jaffee (1995) with regard to Kenya’s FFV export channel. 
Both to create competitive advantage and to manage transaction costs, supermarkets have 
implemented a number of technological, organizational and institutional changes: formal quality 
standards (and their enforcement mechanisms), contracts, distribution centers (centralized 
buying), IT systems for product flow management and communication, shorter supply channels 
(more direct links with farmers) and fewer (but larger) suppliers (like their customers, 
supermarkets prefer one-stop shopping for their procurement). As these chains grow, they are 
building up the market power, financial means and geographic presence to realize all these 
changes and to demand compliance from their suppliers. The supermarkets’ FFV suppliers on the 
other hand have to make transaction specific investments of their own (e.g., organize their labor 
force to deal with short order cycles, develop staggered production systems which smoothen out 
supply over time, and so on) and are therefore also keen on establishing contractual relationships 
which help safeguard these assets to some extent. With supermarkets and their FFV suppliers 
continuously increasing the sophistication of their supply chain in the pattern set out above, they 
are creating a fundamental structural change in agri-food supply chains.  
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In the remainder of this section we focus mainly on the two market leaders (Uchumi and 
Nakumatt, which sell 90% of FFV sold through supermarkets), in order to illustrate first the 
difference and then the convergence of their procurement systems. A few years ago, the two 
leading chains had very different systems (Uchumi with a decentralized system with a preferred 
supplier program that emphasizes the use of medium/large farmers, versus Nakumatt, with a 
centralized system but dependence on an outside specialized wholesaler who relied on small 
growers). Driven by the same determinants (create competitive advantage, lower transaction 
costs), the two systems have very recently converged, however, with Nakumatt bringing 
procurement in-house (into the same holding company) and shifting towards medium/large 
farmers to ensure quality and consistency and reduce transaction costs. For supermarkets, 
smallholder FFV producers operating in groups could theoretically provide the same advantages 
as larger farmers but few such groups exist for domestic market FFV, mainly because organizing 
smallholder farmers in efficient and effective groups has substantial costs associated with it and 
few intermediaries have (by 2003) taken initiatives in this regard. However, the thousands of 
smallholder producers involved in Kenya’s (highly efficient) export channels illustrate that it is 
possible (Jaffee 1995). 
From an initial total reliance on traditional suppliers, the leading supermarket chains have 
thus started to develop the five pillars that have characterized the evolving FFV procurement 
systems of supermarkets in developing countries that are ahead of Kenya in terms of supermarket 
development (Reardon et al., 2003): namely, (i) centralization to distribution centers away from 
store-to-store deliveries; (ii) shift from reliance on traditional wholesalers to use of 
specialized/dedicated wholesalers; (iii) shift from the spot market to use of preferred supplier 
systems; (iv) shift from local procurement to regional, or regionalization; and (v) imposition of 
private safety and quality standards. 
 





FFV procurement at Uchumi is in a transitional phase from semi-decentralised to centralised. 
The retailer has most of its FFV suppliers deliver direct to its four hypermarkets and to the City 
Square branch (which housed its headquarters until 2003) in Nairobi. These five stores function 
as distribution centres to the smaller stores in Nairobi as well as the up-country branches. This 
system applies mostly to high-volume, semi-perishable items sourced domestically (e.g., onions, 
tomatoes, potatoes), imported fruits (e.g., citrus from Israel, South Africa, Egypt) and even some 
imported vegetables (e.g., garlic from China). At the same time, the smaller supermarkets in the 
chain have farmers supply some FFV items (such as greens) directly. The use of dedicated FFV 
trucks (with refrigeration) is not yet economical for the up-country branches, given the small 
volumes involved. 
During 2003, Uchumi constructed a new (large) distribution centre (DC) of 15,000m
2, 
two units of which (one incoming, one outgoing) are equipped with cooling facilities and 
intended for FFV. Improving quality level and consistency is the key reason for centralizing the 
FFV procurement. In combination with a modern IT system that links all of its stores by satellite 
                                                 
5 The information for Uchumi’s procurement system is mostly based on several interviews with Mr Nzioka Kioko, 
Category Manager – Fresh Produce Uchumi, his successor Mr Peter Nderu and first-hand observations by the 
author, interviews with branch managers and the authors’ national survey.  
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communication (also installed in 2003) and that allows a centralized tracking of individual 
product items (SKUs) at each store, the DC will allow for better stock management of all SKUs 
(including the FFV which are sold bar-coded). With the DC facilitating the development of cold 
chains, Uchumi plans to introduce insulated trucks in 2004/5, at which point it will gradually 
start demanding investment in cold chain technology from its suppliers. All FFV items are 
delivered by the different suppliers directly and shelf-ready to the different procurement points. 




As most Kenyan horticultural producers lack the scale of operations to provide the large 
supermarket chains consistently throughout the year with the volume and quality of FFV they 
require, Uchumi’s procurement managers purchase from a mixture of suppliers, including 
farmers of different sizes, traditional brokers and the wholesale market, specialised wholesalers, 
importers and exporters diverting their (excess or quality rejected) FFV to the domestic market. 
Table 4 indicates the composition of Uchumi’s FFV suppliers in 1997 (the year of the first sales 
of FFV at Uchumi), in 2003 and in 2008 (as estimated/predicted by Uchumi’s produce manager). 
In this table, ‘farms’ refers to farms that supply Uchumi either directly or via a single marketing 
facilitator who has a longer-term relationship with them. Examples of such market facilitators are 
farmer marketing associations and specialised wholesalers who work with farms through 
outgrower schemes (e.g., exporters, lead farmers). Marketing facilitators are still rare amongst 
Uchumi’s FFV suppliers (some examples are given below) and in this description we group them 
under ‘direct supplies from farmers’. By contrast, traditional brokers and wholesalers are those 
who bulk supplies from many sources without registering or preserving the identity of the farms. 
We define ‘small farms’ as farms with less than 10 acres, ‘medium-sized farms’ as farms with 10 
to 40 acres, ‘large farms’ as farms with 40 to 200 acres and ‘plantations’ as farms with more than 
200 acres. 
According to Table 4, for vegetables, which make up 45% of the value sold at Uchumi, 
roughly 50% is sourced directly from growers. Medium-sized producers supply the largest share, 
with 25%, followed by large farms with 15%, and small farms with 10%. Brokers supply 45% of 
Uchumi’s vegetables, while the rest (5%) is imported. Small farmers supply mostly leafy greens 
(kale, spinach, traditional African vegetables) and vegetables sold in small volumes (e.g., herbs). 
Other vegetables are supplied by the larger farmers. The latter especially applies to fresh-cut 
vegetable packs because most small-scale farmers do not have a packing shed, which in this case 
is a key requirement. Currently 75% of fresh-cut vegetable packs are supplied by large farms and 
this percentage is expected to increase to 90% over the next 5 years. Brokers mainly resolve 
shortfalls. Imported vegetables include tomatoes, onions, garlic – basic products for which local 











Table 4: Uchumi's FFV Supply Composition by Supplier Type, 1997-2008 (%) 
Vegetables Fruits  Type of supplier 
1997 2003 2008 1997 2003 2008 
Small farms  13  10  15  5  10  10 
Medium-sized  farms  10 25  30 10 10 10 
Large farms and plantations  5  15  35  0  15  35 
Traditional  brokers/wholesalers  70 45  10 70 40 10 
Imports 2  5  10  15  25  35 
Source: authors’ interviews with Mr. Nzioka Kioko, FFV Manager, Uchumi. 
 
For fruits, which make up 55% of the value sold, Uchumi sources 35% directly from growers, 
15% from large-scale farms, 10% from medium-sized farmers and 10% from small producers. 
Imports represent roughly 25% of procured fruit and the remaining 40% is supplied by brokers. 
Small farms play only a small role with regard to fruits (examples of fruits where they are 
involved are watermelons, passion fruit and strawberries). For fruits there is a heavy reliance on 
brokers (because they buy mangoes, for example, from smallholder producers in different 
regions of the country as the seasons change), large-scale farms/plantations (e.g., Kakuzi, a 
6,400-acre agrifood business listed on the Nairobi Stock Exchange) and imports. As a group 
these three suppliers represent 80% of Uchumi’s fresh fruits supplies. 
As Uchumi’s sales of FFV increase, it is moving away from traditional brokers (and their 
long supply chains and the mostly smallholder producers they buy from) to get supplies directly 
from farmers. Table 4 indicates that brokers, as a source of FFV, have decreased from the main 
supplier category (70% in 1997) to less than 50% in 2003 (45% of vegetables and 40% of fruits). 
Reducing its reliance on brokers is the first priority at the moment for Uchumi‘s FFV 
procurement, and management expects that by 2008 brokers will make up no more than 10% of 
supplies, i.e. they will only be used to resolve shortfalls from regular suppliers (similar to 
Freshmark, Shoprite’s FFV procurement arm in South Africa; Weatherspoon and Reardon, 
2003). Direct supplies by farmers allow supermarkets to increase simultaneously control over 
quality, supply reliability and price stability and thus make them more competitive with 
traditional retailers (in terms of product quality and reduced stock-outs).  
Given the increase in scale and the need to be price-competitive, the supermarket FFV 
procurement managers are under cost pressures to deal with fewer and larger suppliers. Table 4 
indicates that large farms are the main beneficiaries of Uchumi’s declining reliance on traditional 
brokers. Between 1997 and 2008 large farmers are expected to increase their share in Uchumi’s 
vegetable supplies 7-fold from 5% to 35%. Absent as suppliers of fruits in 1997, large farms now 
supply 15% and are expected to have a 35% share by 2008. A notable example is the 13,000-acre 
pineapple plantation that is a vertically integrated part of Delmonte, a pineapple and other fruits 
processor (canned fruits, tetrapak-packaged fruit juices). The key attraction for a supermarket 
chain like Uchumi is that a company like Delmonte is already used to dealing in large volumes, 
assuring a consistent volume of high quality supplies for its processing plant. 
Uchumi already relies heavily on a small group of about a 100 medium to large suppliers, 
especially when supplies are low. These 100 farmers form the core of an emerging preferred 
suppliers list. All in all, there were about 150-220 regular, registered suppliers for FFV at 
Uchumi in 2003 (depending on the season). This number is expected to rise to 300 over the next 
four years, mainly because the planned network extension to 50 stores will include several up-
country branches that will add suppliers from the local farming communities. Given the current  
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decentralized procurement system, branch managers can (but are not restricted to) use this list of 
registered suppliers to order FFV in a composition that fits their clientele (payments to suppliers 
are still dealt with centrally). As a group, medium and large farms already make up 40% of 
vegetable supplies and 25% of fruit supplies. By 2008 they are expected to become the dominant 
suppliers with 45% of fruit supplies, and 65% of vegetable supplies. Larger suppliers are not 
only gaining ground because they can supply larger volumes and thus reduce transaction costs 
for Uchumi. These farms are also the ones which have invested in irrigation systems which give 
them greater control over quality as well as allowing them to produce all-year-round. One reason 
why Uchumi prefers direct supplies by farms is that it allows them to inspect them and observe 
their irrigation system first-hand. Having reliable irrigation is a sine qua non for farmers who 
want to get on the supermarkets’ preferred supplier list. 
Marketing facilitators or wholesalers who are specialized (in a particular product) and/or 
dedicated (to a particular supermarket), are rare amongst Uchumi’s suppliers, but they are 
emerging. Currently they focus on smaller-volume FFV items that address particular gaps in 
Uchumi’s FFV product line. The following are some examples: Family Concern, Iga Muka, and 
Sunripe. Family Concern is an NGO that aims to combine development and business objectives 
in building horticultural linkages. Having identified, besides Uchumi, that there exists a high, 
unmet demand for traditional African vegetables, Family Concern set out to build supply 
capacity for traditional African vegetables amongst smallholders. These products appeared in the 
FFV section of Uchumi’s Ngong hypermarket in 2004. Iga Muka, a 30-member farmers’ 
association operating in the Sagana development scheme on the slopes of Mount Kenya, 
succeeded in linking up with Uchumi via the Kenya Agricultural Commodity Exchange 
(KACE), a private sector firm that facilitates linkages between sellers and buyers of agricultural 
commodities, mainly by developing marketing information systems that reduce the information 
asymmetry between farmer and broker. Iga Muka supplies small volumes (60-100kg/week) of 
strawberries to Uchumi. Sunripe Ltd, one of Kenya’s leading agro-exporters, produces from its 
own farms, but also buys from around 1,000 smallholder producers, predominantly as 
outgrowers through contract farming (Shah, 2004). Sunripe is Uchumi’s key supplier for pre-
packs of mixed vegetables. It is used to the high demands (for example, with regard to hygienic 
processing) and contracts often for more volume than it can sell in export markets. Since it is 
contracted to buy the FFV from the outgrowers, it needs a market for the excess production. 
Uchumi gets a high quality product while Sunripe gets more flexibility, while spreading its 
market risk. 
Uchumi’s historic relationship with the government (formerly government-owned and 
still with a strong government presence on its board) has had little impact on its selection of FFV 
suppliers, not only because Uchumi operates like a regular commercial player which has to 
respond to the challenges of a competitive market, but also because the government has largely 
been absent from the horticultural sub-sector.  
Uchumi’s selection of FFV suppliers is also determined by their business management 
skills. Compared with selling to traditional markets, selling to supermarkets implies far more 
formal transaction methods as well as more stringent delivery conditions. However, most 
relationships are informal – only a small number (about 5%) of suppliers have written contracts 
with the chain. These contracts stipulate the delivery volume and frequency (similar to a standing 
order), the quality standard for the product and (a limited set of) code of practice requirements 
such as non-use of banned chemicals, the use of dust covers during transportation and use of 
clean irrigation water (as opposed to sewage water). Although a running average price for the  
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year is indicated, the price is not fixed in the contract as Uchumi must be able to follow price 
movements in the market. Because Uchumi wants to build up long-term relationships with its 
farmers, its pricing policy is never to pay below the actual production cost (even if market prices 
drop below cost) and to balance this by paying lower prices when prices peak. Contracts also 
stipulate what constitutes an accepted reason for non-delivery. At this early stage in the 
formation of the supermarket’s produce procurement system, these contracts are used more as an 
instrument to streamline and formalize the relationship between supermarkets and their preferred 
suppliers, than that it is intended as an enforceable legal document. At this stage both the farmer 
(who faces the risk of not being able to supply the required volume) and the supermarket (who 
risks having to pay farmers a price that is too high above fluctuating wholesale market prices to 
be competitive with traditional retail outlets) prefer contracts (in terms of volumes and prices) 
that have a great deal of flexibility. 
Our interviews with management revealed that the percentage of farmers under contract 
is planned to increase dramatically to 70% within the next five years as key suppliers (who have 
proven their value) are identified. These key suppliers are expected to be distributed as follows: 
30% as medium-sized farms, 40% as large farms and 30% as importers. Contracts will also focus 
mainly on products for which there exists a resolvable supply problem. For example, contracts 
are not needed for local pears, a seasonal item which is available in great quantity during a brief 
period of a few months and totally unavailable during the rest of the year. 
Uchumi reduces transaction costs by requiring that listed suppliers have cell phones. 
About 85% of orders are placed by telephone – even to smaller producers – and for the most 
perishable FFV (e.g., the leafy greens) these orders are placed only 12 hours before expected 
delivery (evening call for next morning delivery). Suppliers should also have bank accounts, as 
Uchumi plans to move to payments through bank transfers on a monthly or bi-weekly basis. 
Suppliers without phones and bank accounts will be delisted in future. 
Uchumi pays 2-4 weeks after delivery rather than the cash-on-delivery payment of the 
traditional systems. Suppliers to Uchumi also pay fees for breakages (unsold or spoiled produce) 
and for promotions. Before the introduction of these breakage fees (a flat rate of 7% of the 
purchase price), Uchumi used to inform farmers of the amount of breakage and ask for 
replacement at the farmer’s cost – a system which was abolished because it increased transaction 
costs and suffered from the practical problem that it was difficult to know which supplier’s 
produce was responsible for what percentage of the breakage. In terms of delivery conditions, 
supermarkets are much more stringent than the traditional system. For example, FFV needs to be 
washed and sorted (some sorting takes place at the receiving bay, but for the greater part if the 
product is not graded, the whole load is rejected). It also has to be supplied regularly (e.g., daily 
for tomatoes and greens, every 2-3 days for semi-perishables like onions), has to weigh an 
assured minimum, needs to be transported with great care (e.g., leafy vegetable bundles need to 
be transported loose, rather than stuffed into bags as is required traditionally) and, if packaged, 
needs to be bar-coded and labeled. Although not required at the moment, packing sheds will 
become compulsory. 
It is evident that several benefits outweigh the above non-traditional costs and 
requirements of supplying to Uchumi, or this market would not attract medium-sized and large 
farmers that have market options. Namely, Uchumi lowers access costs and requirements for a 
variety of inputs. (i) Uchumi intermediates with seed, fertilizer, and chemical suppliers to 
negotiate lower prices and better quality for its preferred suppliers. (ii) Uchumi also 
intermediates with creditors for loans for investment in irrigation and trucks – and thus a written  
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contract with Uchumi serves as a kind of collateral substitute. These loans can be substantial – 
from Ksh400,000 to Ksh6m
6. In this context, Uchumi has been negotiating with organizations 
like the International Finance Corporation in order to provide better lines of credit to its FFV 
suppliers. Once supplier-contracts become more widespread, FFV suppliers will find it easier to 
access credit through regular channels as it will be easier to convince loan administrators at 
commercial banks of their creditworthiness. (iii) Uchumi reduces information costs by 
organizing meetings with its FFV suppliers to inform them of market opportunities and 
requirements; it is also considering providing direct technical assistance to its preferred suppliers 




Although horticulture is well-developed in Kenya, especially for vegetables, and most FFV items 
are procured locally, imported FFV are gaining importance on the supermarket shelves. As Table 
4 shows, imports are expected to increase their share of Uchumi’s vegetable supplies 5-fold from 
2% in 1997 to 10% in 2008. For fruits, imports are even more important, with 25% of supplies 
today originating from other countries. For FFV as a category, imports make up about 15% at 
Uchumi, at least three times the share of imports in the country’s urban FFV market as a whole 
(estimated at less than 5% of total consumption).  
Imported FFV are becoming more important for several reasons, depending on product 
and season. (i) They complete the year-round availability of items which are not (e.g., apples), or 
only during a few months in the year (e.g., pears), produced in Kenya. (ii) They are more 
competitively priced and address low availability due to seasonality (e.g., the mostly informal 
imports of pineapples and bananas from Uganda and tomatoes, oranges and onions from 
Tanzania). (iii) They offer produce of a quality which is not available from producers in Kenya 
(e.g., oranges from Israel, bell peppers from Holland). In some cases, all of these reasons apply 
simultaneously. For example, garlic from China is cheaper, available year-round and of a 
superior and more consistent quality (at least visually) than the locally grown alternative. As a 
consequence, imported garlic, available in Kenya’s supermarkets and open air markets alike, has 
grown from 0 in 1997 to 645MT in 2002 (FAO, 2004). 
These reasons are particularly important to supermarkets that derive their competitive 
advantage over traditional retailers from their broad assortment, better quality, year-round 
availability and (for FFV to a lesser extent) lower retail prices. Furthermore, specialized 
importers provide a structure supermarkets are more familiar with from their dry foods retailing: 
one-stop order-points which can offer regular supplies throughout the year and are accustomed to 
formal business methods. Uchumi does not import FFV directly, but relies on importers, as it 
does not yet deal in large enough volumes of these items. 
Supermarkets, as they grow regionally, will look for suppliers from an increasingly wide 
pool, becoming regional traders in the process. For example, Uchumi’s hypermarket in Kampala 
is closely linked in a bi-country procurement system with the Uchumi chain in Kenya.
7 Various 
FFV items are exported from Kenya to the Kampala store, most notably vegetables which are not 
                                                 
6 For comparison, the average value of land in our sample was around Ksh600,000 per acre, with smallholder farms 
having an average size of 5 acres. These loan amounts therefore are of a similar magnitude as the value of the land 
owned by smallholder farmers (usually their only possible collateral). 
7 The information in this paragraph is based on personal communication with Mr Bernard Kibaru, Uganda Country 
Manager of Uchumi, Kampala, June 2003.  
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as readily available in Uganda as they are in Kenya (such as carrots, cauliflower, herbs, pre-cut 
Asian vegetables). About 40% of the FFV sold in the Kampala store is imported from Kenya or 
elsewhere. At the same time, Uchumi is looking for opportunities to export FFV items from the 
60% they source locally back to Kenya. This is considered desirable by the Ugandan 
government, in order to prevent the arrival of a Kenyan chain further exacerbating trade 
imbalances and the flooding of the Ugandan market with agri-food products from Kenya, but 
rather representing a ‘win-win’ situation where Uchumi helps to build a procurement system that 
relies on growers in both countries. No Uganda-to-Kenya trade exists within Uchumi’s FFV 
procurement system at this time, although pineapples imported through traditional trading 
channels/brokers end up on its shelves in Kenya. The extent to which this regional sourcing will 
become important depends on many factors, most notably (i) how fast the chain will regionalize, 
(ii) how fast it will modernize its FFV procurement system (especially with respect to 
centralization and cold chains) and (iii) the nature of suppliers found in regional markets outside 
Kenya.  
 
Safety and Quality Standards 
 
Since it first started selling FFV, Uchumi has required its preferred suppliers to dedicate all their 
top-grade output to it (they can sell lower grades to the traditional channels). FFV quality 
standards are ‘private’ (specified by the buyer, not the government) and are for the greater part 
limited to appearance (colour, size, blemishes, etc.). Produce is inspected visually by Uchumi 
personnel at the point of delivery (the five procurement points above). For example, for tomatoes 
the (current) Uchumi quality standard consists of about 20 specifications including for 
cleanliness, size, shape, weight, variety, and so on.
8 Produce not meeting the quality standards is 
rejected. About 10% of FFV is rejected, due to failure to meet quality requirements. Of this 
rejected FFV 45% comes from small farms, 45% from brokers and 10% from medium-sized 
farms and importers (produce from large farms is rarely rejected). Over time suppliers learn 
which quality is acceptable (it varies with seasonal availability; i.e., standards are lowered when 
supplies are low) and they work towards supplying this quality only to supermarkets.
9 Unlike the 
traditional marketing channels, selling a lower quality for a lower price is not an option. 
Quality standards are applied at reception from preferred suppliers without contracts, or 
imposed within the contracts for the small (but rapidly increasing, as noted above) share of 
suppliers that have contracts. For the latter, Uchumi uses the measures for reducing quality risk 
identified by Hueth et al. (1999) in the case of FFV contracts in California: (i) monitoring farms 
in the field (e.g., irrigation system) to see if they have the capacity to produce FFV of quality; (ii) 
promoting management practices that lead to quality by specifying which variety farmers should 
grow, even assisting them to get the right seed quality to grow; (iii) measuring quality directly at 
the point of delivery; and (iv) sharing price risks with farmers (indirectly) via breakage fees. 
Neither Uchumi nor any other supermarket in Kenya has developed its own private food 
safety standards; nor does Uchumi implement public food safety standards for FFV. Public 
                                                 
8 Similar standards are already developed (for some products, e.g., for tomatoes since 1985) by the Kenya Bureau of 
Standards, but no case of their implementation in the domestic market was encountered or mentioned in the course 
of our research. 
9 This point was confirmed in our interviews with Uchumi suppliers, several of whom did mention, however, that 
standards were at times misused by individual receiving agents to reject their produce in favour of produce supplied 
by a broker with whom the agent has an informal business relationship.  
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health and food safety standards exist; there is in fact a Kenya standard Code of Practice for the 
horticultural industry (derived from the export industry) which deals with hygiene, worker 
welfare, environmental protection, and so on. However, our interviews with various economic 
actors indicated that these food safety/process standards are not (or minimally) implemented in 
practice (limited to, for example, cleanliness inspections of city markets). Nevertheless, Uchumi 
inspects the farms of key suppliers, inter alia to make sure no sewage water is used for irrigation 
(a practice observed in urban agriculture). This is a guarantee the brokers/wholesale markets 
cannot provide to their customers. 
Another example of how food safety issues begin to come into play is that Uchumi is 
hesitant to procure from small farmers because they are unlikely to be able to invest in packing 
sheds (required for hygienic handling of produce). These sheds are not yet required by Uchumi, 
but before developing long-term relationships Uchumi wants to make sure that the farm has the 
capacity to grow with them. A third example illustrating the emergence of food safety 
monitoring at Uchumi is the specification for tomatoes supplied to Uchumi that they should be 
‘free of chemical residues’. However, detailed food safety process standards for FFV (such as the 
selection and use of pesticides by farmers) are not yet employed by Uchumi or any other 
supermarkets in Kenya, nor are products sample-wise tested for bacterial or pesticide residues. 
However, Uchumi believes that if it could provide a safety assurance to its customers, it could 
triple its current FFV sales. These FFV items could likewise be sold under the Uchumi label 
(already used for the Asian pre-cut vegetable packs supplied by companies like Sunripe which 
comply with strict EU standards). FFV suppliers who meet high quality and safety standards 
(similar to those used in the export sector), and who can produce competitively for the domestic 
market, have substantial market opportunities. 
 




Like Uchumi, Nakumatt built (and started using) a new DC in 2003. Unlike Uchumi, however, 
the retailer has no plans for moving produce through it, as it continues to rely on specialised 
wholesalers, who de facto represent FFV distribution centres. This use of specialised wholesalers 
is driven by two factors. First, Nakumatt started selling FFV with some reservations at first (in 
2001, four years after Uchumi) when it had only seven branches, which implied that volumes 
were too small to warrant an in-house procurement system. Second, Nakumatt employs a 
strategy of outsourcing certain product lines (e.g., clothing, furniture, books, bakery and FFV; 
about 30% of its sales), while it focuses on its core competence, namely, building up a strong 
retail brand. Firms to which such activities are outsourced operate on a consignment basis: (i) 
they manage the store space Nakumatt is willing to dedicate to the product category (e.g., the 
FFV section), retaining ownership of the stock; (ii) their product is sold by Nakumatt, which acts 
as their mercantile agent; and (iii) they are paid the sales revenue minus a commission (an agreed 
percentage of sales) by Nakumatt. In the case of FFV, this commission is currently 20% of sales 
and covers the use of the space (rent, water, electricity, etc.), access to the customer base, sales 
activities and a profit margin for Nakumatt supermarkets. 
                                                 
6 The information for Nakumatt’s procurement system is mostly based on interviews with Mr Abdul Sidi 
(Managing Director) and Mr Rayhon Aswani (Assistant Manager) of Mugoya Vegetable Shop, Mr Mahesh 
(Manager) of Fresh ‘n Juici, and first-hand observations by the authors, interviews with branch managers and the 
authors’ national survey.  
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Nakumatt’s specialized wholesalers are Mugoya Vegetable Shop, in November 2003 replaced by 
Fresh ‘n Juici Ltd, for the Nairobi and Kisumu branches and Shree Ganesh for the two Mombasa 
branches. The need for two wholesalers is a direct result of the absence of cold chains in the 
domestic marketing of FFV. While transportation at night through the higher (and cooler) 
sections of western Kenya towards Kisumu is feasible in terms of preserving produce freshness, 
this is less the case when transporting to the more distant, hotter and more humid Mombasa 
region.  
Mugoya and Shree Ganesh are greengrocers which over the years have built up a 
portfolio of institutional customers (schools, hotels, restaurants, government organizations, and 
so on) whom they supply directly. Mugoya, for example, has about 80 of such institutional 
customers. Catering to such a heterogeneous group, who need daily supplies in small volumes of 
a wide variety of fruits and vegetables, had given these wholesalers the capacities Nakumatt was 
looking for in 2001 when it wanted to sell FFV in its stores. However, by 2003, Mugoya and 
Nakumatt were no longer satisfied with their relationship. Mugoya felt that too much of its 
resources was going into supplying Nakumatt (relative to the revenues) at the expense of its 
relationships with its institutional customers. (Between 2001 and 2003, Nakumatt’s share in 
Mugoya’s sales grew from 0% to 40%, with most of the remainder going to institutional 
customers; a small percentage was sold through its own shop and to Tusker, Nakumatt’s strategic 
partner.) Nakumatt, on the other hand, wanted a faster growth of the FFV section as well as a 
higher commission. In November 2003, both parties separated amicably and Mugoya was 
replaced by Fresh ‘n Juici Ltd, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Nakumatt Holdings, set up in 2003 
as a dedicated supplier of fruits and vegetables to Nakumatt supermarkets (this is similar to 
Freshmark for Shoprite in South Africa, see Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003). Like the latter, it 
benefits from its embeddedness in the Nakumatt network which offers enhanced access to 
financial, human and physical capital. The remainder of this analysis of Nakumatt’s FFV 
procurement system will focus on its two (successive) Nairobi-based wholesale suppliers, 
Mugoya and Fresh ‘n Juici, allowing us to track its evolution over time. 
Mugoya’s procurement system differs from Uchumi’s in two main areas: (i) it has a 
stronger reliance on supplies from smallholder producers; and (ii) it has a broad-ranging set of 
in-house value-adding activities (from sorting to fresh-cut packs). Table 5 provides some detail 
on their supplier composition. 
As Table 5 indicates, Mugoya, which has about 400 suppliers, purchases 60% of its fruits 
and 70% of its vegetables from small producers. Although most of these suppliers are located 
near Nairobi, Mugoya tries to reduce its supply risk by having suppliers from different regions. 
This heavy reliance on smallholders is a part of a broader structure which, aside from the fact 
that farmers supply directly to Mugoya’s central facility in Nairobi, is not very different from the 
traditional system.  
 
Table 5: Nakumatt/Mugoya's FFV Supply Composition by Supplier Type, 2003 (%) 
Type of Supplier  Vegetables  Fruits 
Small farms  70  60 
Medium-sized farms  10  5 
Large farms and plantations  5  5 
Traditional brokers/wholesalers  14  20 
Imports 1  10 
Source: authors’ interviews with Mr. Sidi and Mr. Aswani, Mugoya Vegetable shop.  
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Relationships between Mugoya and its suppliers are not generally geared to the long term. Some 
farmers supply irregularly (in some cases only once or twice in a season) and just pass by 
Mugoya’s facility at that time. Others have ongoing orders (e.g., 10 tons of cabbage a week) for 
which prices and volumes are adjusted on a weekly basis. Changes in orders are given during a 
previous delivery or are called-out. These orders are mostly given to a group of 35-40 larger 
producers (i.e., producers with 5-10 acres or more) or small-scale farmers who act as part-time 
brokers and bulk produce from neighboring farms. For example, there are 3-4 small-scale 
suppliers for cabbages, with some dropping out from time to time. No written contracts are used, 
partly because, according to Mugoya, they are too risky since farmers cannot guarantee volumes 
or do not stick to contracts, while Mugoya cannot guarantee prices. Within this context, these 
small-scale farmers, while mostly regular suppliers known to Mugoya, are not listed in a 
preferred suppliers list. Traceability is not an issue at this time. 
Quality standards (as in written product specifications) are not used and products are not 
necessarily washed or sorted before delivery. Mugoya buys (in principle) everything farmers 
supply, as long as a price can be agreed. It can afford to buy FFV of a range of quality levels 
because it does its own sorting and has a range of customers with varying quality preferences. 
The best quality went to Nakumatt’s FFV section because this is where (mostly high-income) 
customers base their buying decision in part on how fresh and good the product looks. Poorer 
quality goes into its own processing and to the kitchens of its institutional buyers (who process 
part of the FFV). Mugoya is also responsible for taking back produce which is no longer fresh 
enough for display in Nakumatt’s FFV section (in the consignment system it retains ownership 
of the produce until it is bought by a consumer) but does not charge the cost to the farmers. 
Quality permitting, some of the produce taken back can also be supplied to institutional buyers at 
reduced prices (in order to avoid a total loss). Although the firm has cold storage, this is used to 
store imported fruits, overnight storage of left-over produce and internally processed FFV, but 
not as part of a cold-chain structure. Farmers are paid cash-on-delivery at prices which follow 
wholesale markets very closely. While this system is less demanding for suppliers than Uchumi’s 
and hence allows a greater participation by smallholders, it also offers fewer opportunities for 
growth and therefore fewer dynamics. 
Medium-sized and large farmers (15% of vegetables and 10% of fruits) are important as 
they provide a dependable regularity in the supply of key items (e.g., kale, pineapples). These are 
also the farmers who are listed more formally as suppliers. Brokers (14% of vegetables and 20% 
of fruits) are only used in the case of shortages from regular suppliers (mango supplies, for 
example, depend on brokers during a few months in the year when supplies are low). Imports 
(1% of vegetables and 10% of fruits) are less important than for Uchumi, but are of a similar 
composition (pineapples, bananas and ginger from Uganda, apples, pears, plums, peaches, 
grapes, oranges, bell peppers from South Africa, Egypt, Israel or Holland, garlic from China, 
onions, oranges and tomatoes from Tanzania). 
Mugoya, which has 150 employees, does all its value-adding in-house in its own 
centralized facility. It washes, cleans, grades and sorts the produce, ripens bananas, and pre-
packs fruits (e.g., apples, oranges) and vegetables (e.g., onions, potatoes). It also does some 
primary processing, for example making pre-cut vegetable packs for supermarket shelves (e.g., 
stir-fry, snow peas, French beans, baby corn), potato chips/fries for the institutional customers, 
and fruit juices. In order to meet customer expectations with regard to hygiene during processing, 
Mugoya is in the process of obtaining HACCP certification (postponed momentarily because it 
contemplates moving to a new, larger facility). This processing capacity implies that, from its  
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single facility, Mugoya can supply a supermarket like Nakumatt with all the product variety it 
needs to stock a fully-fledged FFV section. 
When Fresh ‘n Juici took over from Mugoya in 2003, its procurement system started off 
from a similar structure, and about half of Mugoya’s suppliers shifted to it (at least for part of 
their supplies). It also produces all the processed vegetable packs it sells in Nakumatt 
supermarkets in-house. Like Mugoya, no contracts are used and quality compliance is limited to 
a visual inspection of the produce at the point of delivery. All supplies are delivered at Fresh ‘n 
Juici’s central facility in Nairobi, except for the (more perishable) leafy green vegetables which 
are delivered direct by farmers to the stores. The company has a cold storage facility and uses it 
in the same fashion as Mugoya. 
However, Fresh ‘n Juici has made some strategic changes. First, while it did get most of 
its current 150 suppliers from Mugoya, it did not inherit the latter’s large smallholder supplier 
base. From our interview with Mr. Mahesh, Manager of Fresh ‘n Juici, we learned that 
smallholders have all but disappeared as fruit suppliers and make up only about 20% of 
vegetable supplies, the main reason being, according to Mr. Mahesh, that they cannot manage the 
quality and volume requirements demanded. For kale, for example, Fresh ‘n Juici wants 
suppliers who can supply at least 300kg twice a week. Examples of FFV items where 
smallholders are still involved are yellow passion fruits, greens, traditional African vegetables 
and herbs. Smallholder producers are replaced by large farms and imports with respect to fruits 
and by medium-sized farmers for vegetables. Both in importance and function, brokers remain in 
a similar role to that they had at Mugoya, i.e., they represent about 10% of supplies and are 
mainly used to deal with shortages. In terms of supplier composition, the shift from Mugoya to 
Fresh ‘n Juici implies a convergence of the development paths of Uchumi’s and Nakumatt’s FFV 
procurement systems, at least in terms of the relative importance in the supplied FFV volume of 
the different types of suppliers .  
Second, Fresh ‘n Juici also shifted to a low margin-high turnover strategy. Suppliers, still 
paid cash-on-delivery, received higher prices than they got under Mugoya (i.e. close to the prices 
in the traditional market), while consumer prices in Nakumatt’s stores were reduced. Our price 
survey, for example, indicated that where as Nakumatt’s prices for a selection of FFV 
items/stores were on average 17% higher than Uchumi’s in November 2003, they were only 7% 
higher in April 2004. Taking a new price promotion into account, whereby consumers using 
Nakumatt’s SmartCard (a customer loyalty card) get an additional 5% discount on FFV, the price 
difference almost disappears. 
Third, its nature as a dedicated supplier to Nakumatt also facilitated a heavier 
involvement of management on the sales floor. In combination with a substantial investment in 
extensive personnel training (Fresh ‘n Juici has 120 employees), this increased attention led to a 
more attractive presentation of the FFV section. While it is mainly a dedicated Nakumatt (and 
Tusker) supplier, Fresh ‘n Juici may well expand over time to include institutional buyers as well 
(thus also reducing its losses due to breakages). It has been given the objective (by the Nakumatt 
Holding group) of raising FFV sales at Nakumatt from the Ksh8m. per month under Mugoya in 
2003 to Ksh50m. per month within 3 years. By April 2003 (only five months after it took over), 
Fresh ‘n Juici was already well under way to reaching its objective as sales had doubled to 




5. Implications for Development Policies and Programs 
 
5.1 Importance as a Demand-Side Base for Agricultural Diversification 
 
Supermarkets were a tiny niche in Kenya only a decade ago, but due to their 18% a year growth 
rate since 1995 continuously removing market share from traditional retailers along the way, 
they now have 20% of urban food retail. In a few years the urban population share will pass 50% 
(it stands at 40% today, from 15% in the 1970s), and at current growth rates supermarkets will be 
among the key gatekeepers to Kenyan dynamic urban markets in 5-10 years. This makes them 
increasingly important subjects of development policy attention for government and donors 
focused on helping Kenyan smallholders access dynamic urban markets and diversify their 
agriculture into higher-valued products. 
Driven by demand-side reasons (consumers are shifting from traditional retailers to 
supermarkets), it is likely that the supermarket sector will continue to grow in Kenya and to 
displace traditional retailers – that is, following the international pattern. As the chains grow, 
they are more able to implement the kinds of procurement system changes discussed in this 
essay, which in turn drives down their costs so that they can charge lower prices and undermine 
traditional competitors, and so further expand – a virtuous cycle for them. There is already 
evidence that this pays off for them and for the urban consumers; Neven et al. (forthcoming) 
show that supermarkets charge on average 5% lower prices (compared with small shops) for 
processed foods, and although their prices are higher for most fruits and vegetables, for key 
‘poor consumers' foods’ such as spinach, the largest chains already have prices at or lower than 
open markets for products of similar quality. 
We posit that the above-described process of supermarket development is the start of an 
ascending competitiveness vis-à-vis traditional retailers of fresh foods, as has been seen in other 
developing countries for the same reasons. While Kenyan supermarkets have moved quickly into 
staples and processed food markets (such as for flour and edible oils and snacks), they have only 
begun to make inroads into the FFV market. This follows an international pattern. FFV are an 
important market for the promotion of agricultural diversification for small farmers, as the 
production of FFV is relatively free of economies of scale, at least with respect to land size 
(although the production and post-harvest processes are often demanding of various forms of 
capital, including human, organizational, and physical capital). Despite Kenyan supermarkets 
having only just started merchandising FFV, the volumes they handle, and the amount they 
procure from Kenyan farmers, are rapidly approaching the importance of the export market 
(handling 35,000 tons versus 67,000 tons exported). Moreover, the lead chains are increasing 
their FFV sales quickly, and working costs out of and quality into their procurement systems. 
 
5.2 Challenges to Supermarket Procurement Systems in Kenya 
 
The front-runner chains (in a concentrated supermarket sector) are moving towards a 
procurement system converging to the system developing elsewhere in developing regions 
(Reardon et al., 2003), including centralisation of procurement and shifts from traditional brokers 
to specialised/dedicated wholesalers, and from spot markets to use of preferred supplier systems, 
and to use of private quality standards with (barely) incipient use of private safety standards. 
These shifts have meant, already in this early stage of supermarket development in Kenya, that 
supplies come mainly directly from large and medium-sized farmers and somewhat from small  
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farmers, and to a moderate but decreasing extent from brokers who, in turn, are supplied mainly 
by small farmers. These patterns and trends are driven by competition and a need for chains to 
reduce costs and enhance quality and consistency. 
Over the next half decade, issues will probably arise with respect to supermarkets 
continuing to source mostly from large and medium producers producing for the domestic and 
export markets. As supermarket procurement volumes grow substantially, that system will be 
strained, and there will be a natural need to extend the grower base locally – or to import more.  
On the one hand, there may be few obstacles to sourcing much more from Kenyan 
large/medium farmers in the short to medium term. These farmers are indeed switching from 
traditional to supermarket channels, but they are also increasing their overall production, 
including production for supermarkets – so one could argue that they will be able to handle 
increased sales to supermarkets in the future (Neven et al. 2005). Moreover, in other countries, 
such as Costa Rica, China, Chile and Mexico, we have seen medium/large farmers who were 
focused solely on exports turn in recent years to being major, and increasing, suppliers to local 
supermarkets as the profitability of such sales, and the capacity of the supermarket procurement 
system, have grown. Some of this growth in Kenya will, of course, come through commercial 
outgrower schemes which in general engage small growers. In fact, in places like Mexico much 
of the small farmers’ involvement in the supermarket channels has been via grower/shippers who 
have their own production as well as outgrower schemes with small growers; they select top 
grade for export, top-second grade for supermarket channels, and the rest goes to the wholesale 
market. This seems a likely scenario over time for supply expansion to Kenyan supermarkets as 
medium and large growers need to expand volumes beyond their own-production capacity.  
On the other hand, supermarkets can increase their produce volumes by drawing on 
imports, creating intra- and extra-regional trade. Note that Kenyan supermarkets (and the 
traditional sector brokers) are already selling cheap produce from the East Africa region and 
even cheaper produce from China, such as garlic. What is to prevent Kenyan supermarkets to 
increase sourcing cheap produce directly from Tanzania or Uganda in the region or from more 
distant, but very price-competitive suppliers in India or China? Kenya’s leading supermarket 
chain (largely government-owned Uchumi) has always stuck to its policy of sourcing at least 
85% of what is sells from Kenyan suppliers (Daily Nation 2004), but can it afford to continue to 
do so in the increasingly competitive supermarket environment? Government policy, such as 
regional trade policy, will also affect the extent to which supermarkets will be able to expand 
produce supply from external sources or will have to rely on local producers. From a policy 
viewpoint, the issues are mixed. The Tanzanian government reacted to Shoprite importing cheap 
tomatoes by imposing protection at the behest of local producers. In contrast, Uchumi indicated a 
willingness to source Ugandan produce to send to Kenya as part of its entry into Uganda. And 
Uchumi sends Kenyan produce into its Ugandan stores. The supermarket chains will be motors 
of trade in the region, and the debate about the pros and cons of protection and regional trade 
liberalization will be magnified as the chains spread. 
 
5.3 Impending Challenges to Smallholders 
 
The above means that small farmers are only one of several options for supermarkets to turn to 
as their growth strains current procurement systems and sources. And it means that supermarkets 
may join policy and other market-institutional changes in Kenya as key motors in transforming 
the food markets facing small farmers.  
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The squeeze on small producers, as it is manifesting itself, comes through supermarkets’ reduced 
reliance on brokers, who source much of their stocks from smallholder producers. Smallholders 
are thus squeezed out as indirect suppliers via brokers to supermarkets, but smallholder supplies 
can replace the large farmer supplies diverted in the traditional system. Hence, at this initial stage 
of supermarket development in Kenya, the rise of supermarkets is not yet excluding small 
farmers from supplying the market, but is rather reducing the presence of their large/medium 
competitors from the traditional system, opening up an opportunity for them in the traditional 
system to a large extent, and in the supermarket market channel to a limited/modest extent at 
least as long as supermarkets can keep up their 18% annual growth, while sourcing mainly from 
larger/medium commercial farmers. 
However, looking to the next 5-10 years, there are several impending challenges and 
opportunities that will face small farmers as the supermarket sector develops, and policy-makers 
and development programs should observe the situation closely in order to help farmers adapt to 
it.  
(i) As supermarkets increase their share in urban markets and the traditional retail market 
concomitantly shrinks, small farmers, if they want to sell to urban markets, will increasingly 
have to sell to supermarkets or the surviving non-supermarket urban food market that is 
competing with them. The latter competition may take the form, as elsewhere in the world today, 
of small shops aggregating to form procurement clubs, or open air or covered markets improving 
quality and hygienic standards. All this means that the market requirements facing small farmers 
will follow an upward trend, whether directly or indirectly caused by the retail transformation. 
This does not mean that small farmers should be aiming at shifting from other buyers to 
only selling to supermarkets, even if they are able to do so. It is clear that, with the combined 
vicissitudes of any given retail company (such as the trade press currently reports for Uchumi; 
Wachira 2004) as a client for a farmer, and the stiff requirements of participating in the 
supermarket channel, it behooves a farmer to manage risk, seek market options for the various 
grades of his/her product, and sell to a portfolio of market channels, including exports, 
supermarkets, and wholesale markets, not to mention keeping the rural market option. 
(ii) Much of the direct sourcing from small farmers by the major chains is done at present 
in the ‘up-country’ stores that are not – yet – well connected to nationwide or regional sourcing 
systems. The development of efficient transport, distribution centers, and cold chains will, in 
Kenya as elsewhere, make it easier for the chains to source from all zones of the country. Thus, 
current small-farmer suppliers for up-country stores will increasingly have to compete with 
medium/large farmers, and competitive small farmers, throughout Kenya for a number of 
product markets that were formerly de facto protected by high transaction costs for the chain, but 
will soon not be. International procurement from a number of countries will extend this 
competitive pressure on the local small farmer competing with Chinese or Tanzanian farmers in 
the procurement arena. 
(iii) A critical issue is the extent to which small farmers themselves will make the 
requisite investments (in risk management, product diversification, value added, and marketing 
expansion) to take advantage of the important opportunities provided by the supermarkets. Much 
will depend on the terms and conditions they face from the buyers (the chains or their dedicated 
wholesalers), such as contracts that reduce risk, limited payment periods to cut the financial 
burden, and so on. We have seen in other countries that small farmers, on the margin of 
profitability and with few if any cash reserves, are sensitive to these conditions, which are, of 
course, also the subject of government regulation and/or private sector commercial codes in  
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Europe, the United States and parts now of Latin America and Asia. Much will also depend on 
whether governments, NGOs, and donors build up the capacity of small farmers, in particular in 
groups, to sell to this channel (in particular, the vector of capital needed to meet the market 
requirements of the supermarket channel, including physical, organizational, social, and human 
capital). This essay is limited in its scope to data from retailers and wholesalers, but Neven et al. 
(2005) presents detailed data on grower decisions to participate in the supermarket vs. traditional 
market channel, and their relative costs and benefits, shedding further light on these emerging 
issues of grower participation. 
 
5.4 Implications for Development Programmes and Policy 
 
Given the impending challenges quite probably just around the corner, the next few years 
provide the crucial window through which government, NGO, and donor programmes can help 
to upgrade the upper tier of small farmers to be able to position themselves as suppliers to this 
dynamic urban market. The changes in the procurement systems discussed above (of 
supermarkets, and probably also of other urban retailers competing with them) suggest that this 
upgrading will need to be diverted towards increases in quality, consistency, volume, new 
commercial practices, and use of new technologies. 
We have briefly shown that it is possible for small farmers to participate (such as the case 
of small farmers selling greens to Uchumi), and we believe that these experiences can and must 
be replicated and scaled up. This is now done mainly through traditional intermediaries who 
aggregate product over many small farmers and has the advantage of overcoming the volume and 
transaction-costs problems facing individual small farmers selling to supermarkets, but has the 
disadvantage of relying on a declining market (the traditional broker) and forgoing the margin. 
Two other options are attractive: working for a grower/shipper (supplying local supermarkets) in 
an outgrower scheme under contract, or supplying directly via an association bulking, grading, 
packing and shipping product from its members. Development programs and policy-makers can 
do several things to help farmers take, and prosper in, these paths. 
First, governments, NGOs, and donors can facilitate small farmers’ access to three key 
elements in order to have the capacity to supply the supermarket channel: (i) market information 
identifying the buyer and its requirements, and establishing a market relationship such as having 
an implicit or explicit contract from the supermarket or the specialized wholesaler, i.e., being on 
the list; (ii) viable organization/association to reduce co-ordination costs and enforce delivery 
from members; and (iii) the requisite physical investments (say in equipment) and managerial 
improvements to meet the specific product and transaction standards required by the supermarket 
chain. A program that aims to assist a farmer to sell to supermarkets (or outgrower schemes or 
wholesalers) by providing one of these but not the others will not work; for example, association-
building is necessary but not sufficient. Berdegué (2001) illustrates this point with examples of 
successes and failures of small farmer organizations in Chile. Moreover, these elements can be 
mutually reinforcing, for example where having a contract (being on the preferred suppliers’ list) 
acts as a substitute for collateral, inducing a bank to make a loan to a small farmers’ group for 
the purchase of equipment (an example from Croatia is given in Dries et al., 2004). 
Second, governments, NGOs, and donors can facilitate tri- or quadri-partite relationships 
that facilitate smaller farmer participation. An example can be found in Indonesia, where there is 
a combination of a small farmer organization (Makar Buah), a supermarket chain (Carrefour), a 
seed/chemical company (Syngenta), a government extension program, and a  
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specialized/dedicated wholesaler (Bimandiri), in a fruitful combination to market melons 
(Reardon, 2004). Carrefour supplies the guaranteed market, Syngenta the financing, and the 
wholesaler the intermediation and co-ordination. This kind of combination can also be 
accomplished through a donor development project, such as the USAID/Michigan State 
University Partnerships in Food Industry Development – Fruits and Vegetables project (PFID-
F&V) in Nicaragua, where a US university facilitates the market connections for small farmer 
organizations with the local supermarket chains, NGOs such as Technoserve provide technical 
assistance, supermarket chains such as CSU and La Colonia provide the guaranteed market, and 
donor funds from USAID provide the financing. The project has a graduation policy whereby the 
small farmer-organizations progressively take over the needed investments and then maintain the 
market link themselves (Weatherspoon and Membreño, 2004).  
Third, assistance programs focused on agricultural diversification can help small farmers 
with the necessary training and equipment, such as transport and cold chains, to produce those 
perishables for which these farmers are likely to be competitive in the supermarket market-
channel. This assistance should be carried out in a way that walks the tightrope between 
alleviating poverty as much as possible, and inducing distortions in market or investment 
incentives. We have seen above that these products are mainly the highly perishable products 
such as leafy greens (e.g., traditional African vegetables) in which a correctly equipped 
smallholder can have an advantage. Assistance programs are likely to find further promising new 
market opportunities amongst the wide set of produce items for which supermarkets are eager to 
shift away from the current traditional brokers to more direct supplies by farmers (e.g., potatoes, 
carrots). In some cases this will imply producers from different regions to cooperate with each 
other in order to address the year-round delivery requirement of supermarkets currently resolved 
by brokers (e.g., for mangoes). By contrast, we expect rapidly increasing cost and quality 
competition for small farmers competing in this channel in bulk products such as bananas and 
tomatoes. These can be large-volume profitable enterprises, but the programs should be aware of 
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